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on guaranteeing access to West Berlin (see documents #3-
of a peace treaty must serve us, that we will conclude
4 below). Nevertheless, Khrushchev had clearly decided
it when we need it.... We support the GDR s
by this point to abandon a separate peace treaty with the
measures, but we do not agree that it is absolutely
GDR, while Ulbricht still wanted to force the issue.
necessary to use the peace treaty as a slogan for the
Ulbricht brought up the issue of a separate peace
elections to the Volkskammer.
treaty during his first session with Khrushchev on
February 26. The failure to conclude such an agreement,
Khrushchev even expressed understanding for
he told Khrushchev, had undermined the authority of the
Kennedy s position. He openly voiced his concern
SED and the Soviet Union inside the GDR. In wide
already posited by Hope Harrison about what Ulbricht
circles of the population, he said, the opinion has arisen
might do if the Soviet Union granted him control over the
that the Soviet Union and the GDR have overreached
access routes to West Berlin.27 The Thompson-Gromyko
themselves in the struggle for a peace treaty. Ulbricht
talks are a step backwards in comparison to the earlier
pleaded with Khrushchev to conclude a separate peace
talks. The USA wants to raise its price. We have said
treaty by the end of the summer. It would assist the SED
openly that these are no foundations for negotiations.
in the upcoming election campaign to the East German
Previously, [U.S. President John F.] Kennedy presented
parliament, the Volkskammer, and help restore the party s
his viewpoint on the borders of Poland and the CSSR
tarnished image. The conclusion of a peace treaty, he
[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]. Of course he cannot
suggested, need not exacerbate relations with the West; the
ratify the German border between the GDR and West
GDR was willing to sign a peace treaty that left open
Germany. One cannot expect that of him. He is trying to
matters relating to transit to West Berlin. If the West
reach an agreement for example, on an international
proved recalcitrant, the Soviet bloc could still use access to
[border] control. In one interview, he posed the question
West Berlin as a lever to compel the Western powers
himself of what one can do and to whom once can turn if,
acceptance of the separate agreement.
for example, Ulbricht infringes upon the [existing] order
Khrushchev rejected Ulbricht s plea. Although the
regarding access routes to Berlin. To whom can one turn
Thompson-Gromyko talks were a step back from the
in such a situation? In case Ulbricht was hoping for
West s earlier statements, the Warsaw Pact could not
assistance from the Chinese, Khrushchev dispelled his
afford to exacerbate the situation by signing a separate
illusions. The Albanians and the Chinese, he said, are
peace treaty with the GDR at least for the time being.
criticizing us with regard to the peace treaty and West
Khrushchev cited two major reasons. First, there was a
Berlin. What are they doing themselves? (Portuguese
possibility of war with the West if the Soviet Union turned
colonies in India, Hong Kong, etc.).
over control of the access routes to West Berlin to the
In effect, Khrushchev ordered Ulbricht to give up his
GDR. Second, there was the threat of an embargo against
campaign for a separate peace treaty and to focus instead
the socialist bloc. He explained:
on strengthening the GDR s economy, seriously weakened
by the crisis over Berlin. The Soviet leader remained
One must see things the way they are. We are
committed to granting the GDR more assistance than his
222 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11
planning chief, Alexei Kosygin, thought was wise. ( In failings in agriculture in particular, Ulbricht s rejection
response to an objection by Comrade Kosygin, the report of his pet project of introducing corn to East European
on the February 26 meeting reads, Comrade Khrushchev agriculture.31 Khrushchev s son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei,
replied that we cannot act like petty traders. ) editor-in-chief of Izvestiya, vocally criticized Ulbricht at a
Nevertheless, in contrast to the meeting with Ulbricht in gathering of Soviet-bloc journalists in May 1962. In his
November 1960,28 he now gave Kosygin free rein to interview with the East German leader, Adzhubei
criticize the GDR s economic policies. Khrushchev declared, Ulbricht had not expressed a single fresh
himself chided Ulbricht for importing potatoes from thought. He was still blaming all the GDR s economic
Poland a particularly pointed comment, given difficulties on militarism in the FRG. We got the
Ulbricht s frequent criticisms of Poland s failure to impression, Adzhubei continued, that Ulbricht is unable
collectivize agriculture29 and Kosygin noted that the to deal with the fundamental question: how to achieve
GDR, a former exporter of sugar, was now importing it. results in agriculture they should work on it. Phrases
The East Germans, Khrushchev and Kosygin argued, were cannot replace potatoes, which the GDR does not have. 32
devoting great resources to building modern city centers Adzhubei, of course, would make even harsher remarks
when they needed to invest more in agriculture. In a final about Ulbricht during his mission to Bonn in July-
blow, the Soviets ordered Ulbricht to activate trade with August 1964.33 The tensions between Ulbricht and
Bonn to the maximum extent in order to help overcome Khrushchev in 1964, the recently-declassified documents
the GDR s economic difficulties. The subtext was clear: make clear, had their origins in the differences of 1961-62
neither the GDR nor its allies could economically afford a over the East German economy and a separate peace
separate peace treaty. Although the Soviet bloc, treaty.
Khrushchev told Ulbricht on February 27, would
aggressively pursue a campaign for a separate peace
treaty, we [the Soviet Union] will decide at what point to Document No. 1 (Excerpt)
conclude it. The Soviet Union, of course, never found Transcript of a meeting between the delegations of the
the right moment to conclude such an agreement. PZPR and the SED in Moscow, 2 December 1969
Conclusions ... [Polish Premier Józef] Cyrankiewicz: Earlier you
Khrushchev s decision to provoke the Berlin Crisis in spoke about closing the border [to West Berlin]; I would
November 1958 was the product of economic, as well as like to remind you of how many times the Poles [i.e., the
military-political, miscalculation. The Soviet leader Polish communists] proposed that it be closed.
overestimated not only the potential of the changing
Gomu ka: And how much earlier!
strategic balance to squeeze concessions out of the West,
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