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epistemology, but a position arranged entirely the way it pleased, relieved it of thinking
through the relationship of its categories. In this regard Heidegger differs from his teacher
only insofar as he relocates the contradictory program away from its Husserlian staging-
grounds, the consciousness, and into the transcendence of consciousness, a conception
which by the way was already anticipated by the preponderance of the noema in
Husserl s middle period. However the incompatibility of the pure and that which was
graphically concrete [Anschauliches] compelled the substrate of its unity to be chosen so
indeterminately, that it no longer contained any moment in which either of the two
demands could belie the other. That is why the Heideggerian being may be neither
existing nor a concept. It must pay for the unimpeachability thereby achieved with its
nihility, with an unattainability by every thought and every intuition, which leaves
nothing left in hand except for the self-sameness of the mere name.*7* Even the endless
repetitions which abound in Heidegger s publications are to be ascribed less to his
honesty than to aporetics. Only through the determination can a phenomenon reach
beyond itself. What remains completely indeterminate, is said over and over again as a
substitute for this, like gestures, which have no affect on their objects of action, but are
repeated over and over again as a senseless ritual. The philosophy of being shares this
ritual of repetition with mythos, which it would happily be.
Volte [French: sudden about-face] 121-123
The dialectic of being and the existent that no being can be thought without the existent
and no existent without mediation is suppressed by Heidegger: the moments, which are
not, without one being mediated by the other, are to him immediately the One, and this
one is positive being. But the sum does not check. The debtor-relationship of the
categories is put on trial. Driven out by the pitchfork, the existent returns; the being
which is purified from the existent is an Ur-phenomenon only for so long as it
nevertheless has the existent in itself, which it excludes. Heidegger deals with this with a
master-stroke; it is the matrix of his thought in its entirety. His philosophy lays hands on
the well-nigh indissoluble moment of the existent with the terminus ontological
difference. What in any case is to be understood under such a being , which is
presumably completely independent of the sphere of the ontic, must remain unsettled. Its
determination would draw it into the dialectic of subject and object, from which it is
supposed to be exempted. In this indeterminacy, in what is probably the most central
place of Heideggerian ontology, lies the reason that the extremes of being and the
existent must also remain necessarily indeterminate towards each other, so that it cannot
even be said, wherein their difference lies. The talk of the ontological difference
reduces itself to the tautology, that being would not be the existent, because it is being.
Heidegger consequently makes the mistake which he reproaches Western metaphysics
for, namely that what being would mean as distinct from the existent, would remain
unsaid. 7 Under the breath of philosophy the existent becomes an ontological factual state
*8* [Tatbestand], the dimmed and hypostasized expression of the fact that being can so
little be thought without the existent as, in keeping with Heidegger s founding thesis, the
existent without being. Therein he executes his volte [French: sudden about-face]. The
privation of ontology, which cannot make do without what opposes it, without what is
ontic; the dependency of the ontological principle on its counterpart, the inalienable
skandalon [Latin: scandal] of ontology, becomes a piece of its inventory. Heidegger s
triumph over other, less canny ontologies is the ontologization of the ontic. That no being
is without the existent, is reduced to the form, that the being of the existent belongs to the
essence of being. Therein something true turns into untruth: the existent into an essence.
Being arrogates to itself what on the other hand it would not like to be in the dimension
of its being-in-itself, of the existent whose conceptual unity always means the meaning of
the word being anyway. The entire construction of the ontological difference is a
Potemkin village. It is constructed solely to have all doubts in absolute being brushed
aside that much more sovereignly, by means of the thesis of the existent as being s mode
of being.*9* By reducing everything individually existent to its concept, that of the ontic,
what makes it into the existent, in contrast to the concept, consequently disappears. The
formal general-conceptual structure of the talk of the ontic and all its equivalents takes
the place of the content of that concept, which is heterogenous to what is conceptual.
What makes this possible is the fact that the concept of the existent therein not at all
dissimilar from Heidegger s celebrated one of being is the same one which
encompasses the purely and simply non-conceptual, circumscribing what does not
exhaust itself in the concept, without however ever expressing its difference from what is
encompassed. Because the existent is the concept for everything existent, the existent
becomes itself a concept, an ontological structure which merges seamlessly into that of
being. The ontologization of the existent is reduced to its most precise formulation in
Being and Time: The essence of being-there [Dasein] lies in its existence [Existenz]. 8
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